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This thesis examines the prioritization of religious identity among Central 
Africans in the wake of the 2013 Séléka crisis. Before the Séléka came to power, 
ethnicity was the identity that had the most political salience in the Central African 
Republic. During the crisis, religious identity was prioritized over all others. This thesis 
researched a number of possible causes of this identity shift, from the agendas of 
domestic and foreign politics to mass-level tensions and demographic changes. This 
thesis argues that the prioritization of religious identity over ethnic identity among 
Central Africans is an example of an elite-driven identity change. After being driven from 
power, southern political elites mobilized Christianity in response to the Séléka takeover 
because it was an identity the majority of southern Central Africa could rally behind.  
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A.  MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
The political history of the Central African Republic is a complex and violent one. 
Since independence in 1960, with two exceptions, the heads of state in the Central 
African Republic have come to power via a coup. By the third coup, political elites 
increasingly began to rely upon their own ethnic groups to provide them with the fighters 
needed to take and maintain power, while the group was rewarded with state resources.1 
This many-spoked wheel was smashed in March 2013, when a motley group of fighters, 
known as the Séléka, from the predominantly Muslim northeast part of the Central 
African Republic gained control of the capital and overthrew the government of François 
Bozizé, whose ethnic group hails from the southern part of the country.2  
The northeast of the Central African Republic, long ignored by almost every head 
of state, had never before had one of their own in a position of real power in the central 
government. Interestingly, around the time of the Séléka’s rise to power, a shift happened 
in the Central African Republic’s politics. Religious identity, previously secondary to 
ethnic identity, became the most important identifier in mobilizing political support in the 
Central African Republic.3 Never before had elites in the Central African Republic 
expressed their goals in religious language. Tracing the cause (or causes) of this dramatic 
change in the Central African Republic’s politics will be the subject of this research. 
Specifically: What caused religious identity to supplant ethnic identity as the main 
political mobilizer in the Central African Republic during and after the Séléka crisis? 
This thesis argues the shift in religious identity was defensive in nature and was 
caused by southern Christian Central African political elites. Christian elites had ruled the 
country from independence until the Séléka’s 2013 take over. However, the region where 
                                                 
1 International Crisis Group, “Central African Republic: Anatomy of a Phantom State,” Africa Report 
N230, (Brussels: ICG Publishing, 2007): 5, http://old.crisisgroup.org/_/media/Files/africa/central-
africa/central-african-republic/230-central-african-republic-the-roots-of-violence.pdf.  
2 International Crisis Group, “Anatomy of a Phantom State,” 3.  
3 Natalie Dukhan, The Central African Republic Crisis, (Birmingham, UK: GSDRC, 2016): 1, 
http://www.gsdrc.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/CAR_Jan2016.pdf. 
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the Séléka originated meant the overwhelming majority of the group’s fighters were 
Muslims, though they did not mobilize an Islamic identity. In response to their removal, 
these Christian elites capitalized on preexisting tensions and differences between 
Muslims and Christians in order to remove the Séléka from power by isolating them from 
potential support, as the overwhelming majority of Central Africans in the south are 
Christians. 
B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
Africa as a whole is rarely on the minds of many American policy makers and 
practitioners. In Africa, the United States often follows the lead of former colonial 
administrators and regional leaders before responding to a crisis.4 The Central African 
Republic is no different. The United States often follows France’s lead. Yet the Central 
African Republic’s geography makes it critical to the stability of the whole of Central 
Africa. Over the decades, the Central African Republic’s porous borders have allowed 
armed groups from its neighbors to cross in and out of the Central African Republic on 
the way to other objectives. The Central African Republic saw fighters using the area as a 
base of operations and recruitment during both the conflicts in Darfur and in what is now 
South Sudan.5 At other times, Sudanese-backed groups have gone from the Central 
African Republic into Chad to conduct attacks against Idriss Déby’s regime.6 Both the 
Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) and armed groups from the Democratic Republic of 
Congo (DRC) have operated in the southern region of the CAR.7 The United States has 
devoted much effort and treasure to encouraging a stable Sahel and DRC. Without an 
understanding of the situation in the Central African Republic, both of those goals are 
unlikely to be attained.  
                                                 
4 Peter Schraeder, United States Foreign Policy Toward Africa (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1994), 14.  
5 Jennifer Giroux, David Lanz, and, Damiano Sguaitamatti, “The Tormented Triangle: The 
Regionalization of the Conflict in Sudan, Chad and the Central African Republic,” Crisis States Working 
Paper (2009), accessed 26 March 2017, http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/28497/1/WP47.2.pdf.  
6 Giroux, Lanz, Sguaitamatti, “The Tormented Triangle,” 3.  
7 International Crisis Group, “Central African Republic: The Roots of Violence,” Africa Report N230, 
(Brussels: ICG Publishing, 2007): 4, https://d2071andvip0wj.cloudfront.net/230-central-african-republic-
the-roots-of-violence.pdf.  
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Not only do events of the Séléka crisis have geopolitical ramifications, but 
academically this thesis will fit into the established field of ethnic studies. There has been 
much written about ethnic identity in both politics, generally, as well as in armed conflict. 
Though identities wax and wane throughout a person’s life for various reason, it is not 
common for an entire country to mobilize somewhat dormant identities. This thesis, 
however, will study an identity that went from being mostly quiet and never before 
particularly relevant politically to one that literally meant the difference between life and 
death.  
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
In order to fully explore this question there are a number of terms to be defined 
and theories to be discussed first, starting with ethnicity and ethnic identity. Without a 
firm starting point, it would be difficult to discuss how identity shifts. From there, the 
conversation will turn to linkages between ethnic and religious identities, showing that 
religious identities can be used in very nearly identical ways as ethnic labels. Once the 
foundational ideas have been laid, this literature review will then end with a discussion of 
theories that explain why identities shift or change over time.  
This thesis uses Kanchan Chandra’s definition of ethnicity, in which ethnicity is 
“a subset of categories in which descent based attributes are necessary for membership.”8 
These attributes are given by one’s parents. They include physical features, religion, sect, 
language, tribe, clan, race, nationality, region, and caste.9 Kanchan’s definition is useful 
for multiple reasons. First, it is widely used in the field. Second, the three attributes of 
religion, language, and tribe, specifically, are critical to this thesis’ study of the Central 
African Republic. Third, in the periods before and after the Séléka crisis, divisions along 
specifically religious, lingual, or tribal lines can be found.  
This does not mean that identities are singular or static. Over the course of a 
person’s life, the primary identity that defines her will likely wax and wane in importance 
                                                 
8 Kanchan Chandra, “Introduction” in Constructivist Theories of Ethnic Politics, ed. Kanchan Chandra 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2012) 9.  
9 Kanchan Chandra, “What Is Ethnic Identity?” in Constructivist Theories of Ethnic Politics, ed. 
Kanchan Chandra (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012) 63.  
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or even change entirely. Beverly Crawford suggests that all identities, at first, are merely 
cultural, in that they are not used for political mobilization. However, these cultural 
identities become politicized when members of a given group feel their group is being 
discriminated against or another group is being given special privileges. This is 
particularly true during times of economic hardship.10 Some argue that identities 
politicize the fastest when the state is specifically seen as part of the problem for acting 
unjustly, and when politics is seen as zero-sum.11  
Similarly, to understand identity, it is important to note that not only can identities 
harden and soften over time, they can shift or even completely change as well. We can 
imply from the lengthy list of attributes set forth by Kanchan that everyone has multiple 
identities. For instance, this author may be considered “White” in a room with people of 
various racial backgrounds, “Polish” in a room of white Americans, and “Christian” in 
yet another room, but they are all identities into which he was born. Chandra refers to 
every identity a person possesses (i.e. White, Christian, Polish) as nominal identities. The 
identity that a person goes by (whether they chose it for themselves or society dictated 
said identity) is their activated identity.12 This research will focus on the reasoning 
behind deactivating certain identities and activating others in the Central African 
Republic. 
This thesis will consider ethnicity and religion on roughly the same footing. This 
may strike some as odd since theoretically this author could convert to Islam, but he 
could not make himself an Irish-American. While ethnicity may seem a firmer identity 
than religion, both can affect an individual’s preferences or behavior, and as the existence 
of both ethnic and religious political parties throughout the world can attest to, both can 
be politically salient. This thesis is focused on the reasons that a given identity shifts, not 
                                                 
10 Beverly Crawford, “The Causes of Cultural Conflict: An Institutional Approach,” in The Myth of 
‘Ethnic Conflict, eds. Beverly Crawford and Ronnie Lipschutz (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1998): 5; Paul R. Brass, “Ethnic Groups and Ethnic Identity Formation,” in Hutchinson and Smith eds. 
Ethnicity (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996): 87. 
11 See: Bert Klandersman, “How Group Identification Helps to Overcome the Dilemma of Collective 
Action,” The American Behavioral Scientist,” (2002), 891; Richard Jackson, “Violent Internal Conflict and 
the African State: Toward a Framework of Analysis,” Journal of Contemporary African Studies (2010), 
29–52, accessed on 15 February 2017, doi: 10.1080/0258900012014044. 
12 Kanchan, “What Is Ethnic Identity?” 58.  
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on the nuances of different identities. As such, ethnicity and religion will be treated as 
equal (albeit, different) identities.  
Religion in the Central African Republic may potentially be used more like what 
Duncan McDuie-Ra would refer to as an “adjacent identity,” a more general identity that 
can be used to signal shared experiences with similar groups. Typically, these adjacent 
identities are created in response to an exogenous political or social phenomenon. A 
classic example of this would be Iroquois, Sioux, and Apache tribes--who had only 
limited interaction, if at all--referring to themselves collectively as “Native Americans” 
following their similar experiences during the European colonial period and subsequent 
American westward expansion.13 Some would argue that adjacent identities that are 
manifested in routine practices (such as religion) can trump identities received by birth 
(such as ethnicity).14 Whether that is the case or not, most scholars agree that religion as 
an adjacent identity can reinforce other group distinctions and can aide mobilizers both 
internally and externally.15  
Now that the fact that identities can shift or change has been established, it is 
important to discuss what causes that shift. According to Jennifer Todd, there are three 
factors to consider when analyzing a shift in identity: existing identities structures, power 
relations, and resources.16
 
The first two categories deal with the socio-political dynamics 
of a given society. A Catholic’s inability to get a job in certain career fields or harassment 
by security services in Northern Ireland may encourage her to begin to identify herself as 
“British,” for example. The third category may come into play when things like access to 
                                                 
13 Duncan McDuie-Ra, “Adjacent Identities in Northeast India,” Asian Identities 17, no. 3 (October 
2015): 401. doi: 10.1080/14631369.2015.1091654.  
14 Jillian Schwedler, “Islamic Identity: Myth, Menace, or Mobilizer?” SAIS Review 21, no. 2 (July 
2001): 14.  
15 Monica D. Toft, “Religion, Civil War, and International Order,” BCSIA Discussion Papers, 
Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University (2006): 1; Alexander De Juan, “A Pact with the 
Devil? Elite Alliances as Bases of Violent Religious Conflict,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism (2008):, 
accessed on 20 April 2017, doi: 10.1080/1075610080233193; Basdau Matthias, Vullers, Johannes, Korner 
Peter, “What Drives Inter-Religious Violence? Lessons from Nigeria, Cote d’Ivoire and Tanzania,” Studies 
in Conflict and Terrorism (2013), doi: 10.1080/1057510X.2013.82376.  
16 Jennifer Todd, “Social transformation, collective categories, and identity change,” Theory and 
Society 15, no. 1 (January 2005): 452. 
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land in agrarian societies or welfare services in more developing countries are rationed or 
distributed based on identity quotas.  
While Todd’s factors may explain some of the underlying pressures on 
individuals surrounding identity change, they do not explain specifics paths through 
which identities are created or change. James Fearon and David Laitin give three, not 
mutually exclusive, pathways to identity change: broad social and economic structural 
forces, discourse with other groups, or construction by individual agents.17
 
The first 
category includes a number of macrohistorical forces. Benedict Anderson’s work 
exemplifies this category in his assertion that mass literacy helps create identity because 
it allows for a unified system of communication, an ability to build a long-term image of 
the community, and the dying out of weaker dialects.18
 
Another example is how the 
colonial era led to the creation of numerous identities in the Western Hemisphere, as 
people emigrated away from Europe. Although convincing, this line of argument does not 
explain the creation of every identity nor why some forces are more potent than others. 
The second category, discourse, is when a group uses symbolic or cultural 
systems to separate themselves from another group. Abner Cohen supports this notion 
when he notes, specifically with regard to ethnic identity, “contemporary ethnicity is the 
result of intensive interaction between ethnic groupings and not the result of complete 
separatism.”19
 
Symbols and myths are either invented or given more importance within 
the community in order to advance the overall “story” of the group. An example of this is 
how Jews invented the Bat Mitzvah ceremony for girls in the twentieth century or have 
given increased importance to the week of Chanukah, as the prevalence and 
commercialization of Christmas, also in December, increased in the United States and 
                                                 
17 James D. Fearon, and David D. Laitin, “Violence and the Social Construction of Ethnic Identity,” 
International Organization (2000), 851.  
18 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities (New York, Verso, 1993), 44–45; Stephen Van Evera, 
APSA-CP Newsletter, PR 31, (Los Angeles, CA: UCLA Press, 2001), 
http://comparativenewsletter.com/files/archived_newsletters/2001_winter.pdf. 
19 Abner Cohen, “Ethnicity and Politics,” in Ethnicity, ed. John Hutchinson, and Andrew Smith, (New 




This category is open to questions of why some traditions and customs have 
endured and why others have not.21
 
 
The third category, construction by individual agents, occurs at both the elite and 
mass levels. At the elite level, there are numerous reasons to encourage ethnic thinking. 
Paul Brass lays out four specific situations of elite conflict (violent or political) that will 
encourage the development of ethnicity: a) a local aristocracy attempting to maintain 
privilege against a foreign conqueror, b) religious elites competing other religious elites 
from different ethnic groups for power and influence, c) religious elites contending with a 
domestic aristocracy within a single ethnic group, or d) a competition between domestic 
religious elites and an foreign aristocracy.22
 
Others argue that identity mobilization 
results not from conflict but from the fact that it is a more efficient medium through 
which elites can express their message. Patrick Glazer and Daniel Moynihan note for 
example, that it is easier for politicians to prove that they are working to improve the 
lives of people who generally live in a specific region, such as Scots, than it is to do the 
same for diverse set of people, such as the workers of the United Kingdom who face a 
more diverse set of problems and challenges.23
 
Whether the impetus for ethnic 
mobilization is the result of elite conflict or calculation, the theories on their own do not 
adequately address why the masses go along with the attempts at mobilization. 
Whether elite action is a result of conflict or convenience there is a school of 
thought that bridges this debate by saying these actions are the results of incentives from 
institutions. These types of arguments typically center around the system of government 
in a given state. Some argue that the features of federalism, separate governments at the 
national, state/provincial, and local levels, encourage elites to mobilize ethnic 
consciousness, especially if an ethnic group is geographically concentrated at the 
                                                 
20 Herbt J. Gans,,”Symbolic Ethnicity: The Future of Ethnic Groups and Cultures in America,” Ethnic 
and Racial Studies (1979), 10, accessed on 24 May 2017 doi:10.1080/01419870.1979.9993248.  
21 Fearon and Laitin, “Violence and Social Construction,” 853.  
22 Brass, “Ethnic Groups and Ethnic Identity Formation,” 89. 
23 Nathan Glazer and Daniel Moynihan, Introduction, in Ethnicity: Theory and Experience 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1976), 9. 
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subnational levels of government.24 The logic behind these arguments is that federalism 
allows localities more autonomy in things such as education, customs, security, etc. and 
this encourages ethnic groups to think of themselves separately from the rest of the 
country. That in turn encourages further hardening of the ethnic identity.  
Another grouping of elite-led literature focuses less on the structures of a given 
state and more on pressures acting on the elite class. During periods of political 
transition, elites will use whatever tools are available to them to hold on to (or increase) 
their power. Mobilizing ethnic nationalism can be a convenient way for elites to maintain 
their popularity while not giving into democratic headwinds.25 In ethnically primed 
societies, the ability to say the ethnic group is being led by coethnics and not outsiders 
may be enough to satisfy the masses instead of implementing true democratic practices. 
However, it is not necessarily ethnic identity that will be mobilized during these 
transitions. The elites draw on whatever identity gives them access to enough support to 
maintain or win power.26 In multiethnic societies, this may require activating secondary 
or adjacent identities and bringing them into the forefront.  
Conversely, some argue that elites are not on the forefront but are dragged along 
by the people who are the true drivers of identity changes. At the mass level Fearon and 
Laitin argue “members of marginalized categories or individual dissidents may quietly or 
loudly contest common assumptions about particular categories. Their actions may then 
result in the construction of new or altered identities, which may change cultural 
boundaries.”27
 
People profess a given identity and their collective behavior is a self-
reinforcing system, which ensures they are different from other groups. Others might 
                                                 
24 Nancy Bermeo, “A New Look at Federalism: The Import of Institutions,” The Journal of 
Democracy (2002), 110; Monica D. Toft, The Geography of Ethnic Violence (New Jersey: Princeton 
University Press, 2003), 22; Henry Hale, “Divided We Stand: Institutional Sources of Ethnofederal 
Survival and Collapse,” World Politics (2004): 175. 
25 Jack Synder, From Voting to Violence: Democratization and Nationalist Conflict (New York: W.W. 
Norton & Company, 2000), 36; V.P. Gagon, “Serbia’s Road to War,” in Nationalism, Ethnic Conflict and 
Democracy, ed. Diamond, Larry and Plattner, Marc F (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press: 2003), 
117. 
26 Jessic Piombo, Institutions, Ethnicity, and Political Mobilization in South Africa (London: Palgrave 
MacMillan, 2009) 3.  
27 Fearon and Laitin, “Violence and Social Construction,” 853.  
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argue, however, that the masses will not take up the mantle of ethnicity unless they have 
been primed by the state institutions to value ethnic identity. These institutions are not 
specific as they could be elections, representation, security services, etc., but they must 
have some identity dynamic (i.e., an army with a mandated ethnic composition).28
 
Jennifer Todd takes this argument one step further saying that not only does society need 
to be primed but also that either power relations between groups need to change or an 
imbalance in resource distribution.29
 
Without one of the latter two situations society will 
feel no pressure to mobilize politically as an identity group. 
Somewhat ignored by authors on shifting identity (though not necessarily 
excluded from theories such as Fearon’s and Laitin’s) is the role of missionaries and 
conversion efforts on identity shifts. This is particularly germane in African contexts 
where both Christianity and Islam are becoming increasingly political over the decades. 
In regards to Islam, specifically, there has been a noted increase in Islamic proselytization 
across the globe from Saudi Arabian religious authorities. Three factors helped start this 
trend: the politicization of Wahhabism following interaction with Muslim Brotherhood 
members moving to Saudi Arabia, the increase in Saudi revenues following Saudi 
Aramco’s agreement to split profits with the kingdom in the late 1950s, and massive 
guest worker programs in most Gulf countries that exposed said workers to a 
conservative form of Islam.30 These Islamic missionaries spread a very conservative and 
political form of Islam that encourages followers to pressure their governments to 
espouse Islamic principles. Sebastian Elischer’s research showed sharp increases in 
Islamic terrorism in countries where the governments did not co-opt or suppress Muslim 
religious authorities early on.31 Although this thesis does not deal with terrorism directly, 
his research would suggest the potential for politicization of Islamic identity if it is not 
coopted by the government early on. Similarly, there has also been a noted increase in 
evangelical membership on the continent as a whole which most link to recent missionary 
                                                 
28 Crawford, “The Causes of Cultural Conflict,” 10. 
29Jennifer Todd, “Social Transformation, Collective Categories, and Identity Change,” 452 
30 Daniel W. Brown, A New Introduction to Islam (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009), 286–287. 
31 Sebastian Elischer, “Governing the Faithful: State Management of Salafi Activity in the Sahel and 
East Africa,” (paper presented at Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, 25 April 2017).  
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efforts by American churches.32 Evangelical Christianity also tends to be conservative 
and to a certain extent political. It is possible that either or both of these trends have had 
an effect on identity in the Central African Republic.  
D. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
This thesis began with four hypotheses. The first hypothesis supposed that after 
years of political and economic isolation that ethnic groups of the northeast region 
coalesced around Islam as an adjacent identity. They then formed the Séléka to install a 
government friendlier to Muslims and their home region. This hypothesis correctly 
assessed Central Africans livening in the northeast do feel a sense of isolation from the 
rest of the country. However, as this thesis will show, the Séléka not frame its goals in 
Islamic rhetoric and was not caused by increased salience in Islamic identity. 
The second hypothesis was that changing religious demographics within the 
Central African Republic led to a more politicized religious landscape that encourages 
inter-religious strife. Specifically, the author researched influence of Salafi Islam and 
Pentecostal Christian sects as they are prevalent throughout the region and are overtly 
political. This this will show that, while the presence of Pentecostal Churches specifically 
played a minor role, these factors are intervening variables in the politicization of 
religious identity.  
The third hypothesis investigated the role domestic elites played in the 
prioritization of religious over ethnic identity. Specifically, Southern ethnic elites and 
entrepreneurs saw prioritizing Christian identity as the most useful strategy for them to 
gain power and influence in the face of the regime installed by the Muslim Séléka. This 
hypothesis became the thesis of this work. In the Central African Republic there are 
almost a dozen different ethnic groups, some of which can be further reduced into 
subgroups. But the ones in the southern part of the country have one feature that cuts 
                                                 
32 Wes Granberg-Michaelson, “Think Christianity Is Dying? No, Christianity Is Shifting,” Washington 
Post, accessed 4 May 2017 https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/acts-of-faith/wp/2015/05/20/think-
christianity-is-dying-no-christianity-is-shifting-dramatically/?utm_term=.503d2da1dfb7; Or: Pew Research 
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across these cleavages: Christianity. A Christian identity would allow elites vying to 
retake the capital from the Séléka to draw resources and men from a larger pool to use in 
their war effort.  
The fourth and final hypothesis looked at the role of the neighboring states, 
specifically Chad and their role in the rise of the Séléka. Chad is a predominantly Muslim 
country and its leader, Idriss Déby, frequently meddles in Central African affairs in order 
to maintain influence over the ruling regime. This this will show that the Déby Regime 
did play a role in the rise of the Séléka. However, shift prioritization of religious identity 
was a defensive decision by southern Central African elites and not as tool used by the 
Séléka. Thus Déby’s influence is another intervening variable in the story.  
E. RESEARCH DESIGN 
This thesis consists of a single case study: The Central African Republic in the 
years immediately before, during, and after the Séléka crisis. A single case allowed for 
more empirically nuanced analysis of the events in the Central African Republic. A single 
case study also allowed the author to come to more practical, less theoretical conclusions 
as comparisons to a second case most certainly would have required more generalization. 
Though this thesis studied religious and identity mobilization in the Central 
African Republic during the Séléka crisis, that is not to say that all religious identities and 
mobilization were pertinent to this effort. Besides Christians and Muslims there are also a 
number of Animists in the country. How the crisis has affected their identity (if at all), 
remains outside the scope of this research because animism has not been used for large-
scale political mobilization. Similarly, there are ethnic groups that live in the southeastern 
portion of the country but not only are they relatively small and isolated but also 
historically they have not played a major role in any of the political turmoil seen in the 
country. The main concern of this research will be the Christian and Muslim identities 
found in northeast, south central, and southwestern portions of the country.  
The dearth of academic pieces written about the Central African Republic, 
especially in English, and an inability to travel to the country meant this thesis drew 
heavily from humanitarian, nonprofit, and international governmental organizations that 
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are operating in country or in the region. The major players in these categories, Human 
Rights Watch, the United Nations, and the International Crisis Group.  
F. THESIS OVERVIEW  
This thesis is broken up into five chapters. The second chapter provides historical 
and religious context. It shows how demographics dictated elites mobilize ethnicity of 
religion until the Séléka took power with foreign assistance. The third chapter discusses 
enabling factors that allowed elites to capitalize on preexisting tensions between Central 
African religious groups once the conditions on the ground allowed for them. The fourth 
chapter shows elite response to the Séléka takeover and how the politicization of 
religious identity became the norm. The sixth and final chapter discusses the implications 







II. CONTEXTUAL BACKGROUND 
This chapter will provide important context for the remaining of the thesis. It will 
start by discussing the political history of the Central African Republic. It will note three 
eras of political conflict. The first era lasted from independence until the early 1980s and 
did not feature identity as a particularly important tool in political mobilization. The 
second era begins in the early 1980s and ends with Séléka crisis in 2013. In this period, 
ethnic identity was frequently used by elites in political mobilization. The final period, 
from 2013 to the present, features religious identity as the main axis Central Africans 
mobilize along and only happened when southern, Christian elites were totally removed 
from power.  
After discussing these historical events, this chapter will turn to laying out the 
religious demographics and trends found in the Central African Republic. The religious 
demographics help explain why religion was not mobilized until the Séléka’s power grab 
created the political opportunity, and these religious trends explain some of the framing 
processes that were available once the mobilization did happen.  
A. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
Before the Séléka Rebellion, the role identity played in politics waxed and waned. 
At times identity was critical and at other times it was rather meaningless. Identity, of any 
kind, was not mobilized for political gain by elites until the nearly 15-year presidency of 
Andre Kolingba began in 1981. Once identity mobilization became common in Central 
African politics a distinct pattern developed. To take power, political elites find support 
in other ethnic groups and regions. This required mobilizing identities the crossed 
cleavages, usually regional identities. This allowed them cast a wider net in an effort to 
gain more support than the regime in power. Once in power, the new regime slowly 
parred down its coalition to familial and ethnic ties in order to efficient distribute the 
sources of patronage previously discussed to their closest supporters. 
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1. Early History and Independence 
The Central African Republic sits in the Congo River Basin, with the Ubangi 
River, a tributary of the Congo, making up the majority of the country’s southern border. 
Savannah grasslands cover a majority of the country with the exceptions of tropical 
rainforests found in the southwest and the Sahel-like northeast. These climatic differences 
influenced differences of occupation and lifestyle between the people that became 
Central African. In the south, people traditionally farmed or fished. The farther one goes 
northeast in the country, the more farming gives way to cattle raising and the importance 
of the Arab trade and slave networks were.  
The French first arrived to what is now the Central African Republic in the 1880s. 
They hoped to expand their colonial holdings from West Africa to the Indian Ocean but 
were blocked by the British and settled with Ubangi-Shari, as territory was then called, as 
their eastern most colony. Considering it la colonie poubelle—the trashcan colony—
because of its lack of development, inaccessibility, and numerous small-scale slave-
raiding sultanates, the French largely privatized control of the colony for the first few 
decades. In exchange for a fee, the French government gave firms free reign to extract 
what resources they could. The government would step in whenever missionaries 
complained about the abuses committed by agents of the companies too loudly. However, 
control of the colony was largely a private affair for many years. 
When European powers drew what would become the modern borders of Africa, 
they unknowingly set up an important dynamic of the Central African Republic. The 
northeast portion of the country is much different from the rest of the country. 
Historically, the people living in the region have closer cultural and economic links to the 
ethnic groups in what is now Chad and Sudan than they do their southern Central African 
counterparts. For example, the majority of Central Africans from the northeast 
predominately speak Sudanese Arabic while the majority of southern speak Sango, the 
official language of the Central African Republic. As might be implied, the majority of 
southern Central Africans are Christian, while the majority of those in the northeast are 
Muslim. This is largely for two reasons. First, because during the rainy season the area 
becomes a marsh and is nearly inaccessible by ground to the south. What little 
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development the French during the colonial era did not include paving roads to the 
northeast.33 Second, many ethnic groups in southern Central African Republic put as 
much distance as possible between themselves and the northeast for fear of slave raiding. 
With the capital city Bangui firmly in the southeast, southerners had little reason 
throughout history to look to the northeast.  
Since independence in 1960, the Central African Republic’s history has never 
seen much political stability. Of the nine people who have been the Central African 
Republic’s head of the state, six took power in coups.34
 
Only two came to power through 
democratic elections. The constant violent turnover of the government has hampered the 
development of state institutions and the economy as a whole. For example, a country of 
630,000 square miles has less than 24,000 kilometers of roads, of which only around 700 
kilometers are hard surface (Ukraine, a country roughly the same size has seven times as 
many miles of road, almost all of which is hard surface).35
 
Largely because of this, 
government influence does not extend much farther than the capital. 
This is not to say that no leaders of the country never tried to develop the 
economy. Colonel Jean-Bedel Bokassa, who took power from the first President, David 
Dacko, in 1965, in a somewhat bloodless coup (Bokassa personally stabbed a rival to 
death with his ceremonial sabre36 ) was one of them. He launched massive educational 
programs and sought to increased agricultural exports. Though Bokassa personally 
embezzled state funds, he did not tolerate others doing so and the civil service under him 
was competent and efficient.37 Eventually his largess and increasing authoritarian 
leanings (in 1976, he enthroned himself the Emperor of the Central African Empire) 
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infuriated audiences at home and abroad. The final straw broke in April 1979, when 
police killed dozens of students protesting Bokassa’s regime. Later that year France 
organized and led a coup reinstalling his predecessor, David Dacko. 
Dacko lasted only a few years in his position. He relied heavily on a French secret 
service agent named Jean-Claude Mantion, who quite literally ran the country for 
Dacko.38 Political insiders and laymen began to protest what had essentially became a 
return to colonial rule. After he narrowly won a French-arranged plebiscite on his return 
to power by less than .25 percent, Dacko, fearing a future coup, turned power over to 
Army Chief of Staff, General Andre Kolingba.  
2. Mobilization of Ethnic Identity Among Southern Elites  
The Kolingba regime marked an important turn in the political history of the 
Central African Republic. Previously, ethnic identity did not mean much politically. The 
trading language Sango was popular in the area even before the French arrived somewhat 
blunting the differences between ethnic groups.39 During the colonial era, France 
encouraged Sango even further as they saw it as easier than instituting French on en 
masse. Bokassa strongly encouraged a Central African identity, not allowing ethnicity to 
influence the civil or security services. This all changed when Mantion foiled a coup 
attempt by former Prime Minister Ange-Félix Patassé and Generals Francois Bozizé and 
Alphonse Mbaikoua.40 The three plotters managed to escape capture. 
Following the coup, Kolingba dispatched two coethnic—Yakoma—generals on 
punitive expeditions to the home regions of the conspirators. The expeditions raided 
towns, razed villages, and massacred hundreds of people.41 Animosity from Patassé’s 
Sara-Kaba ethnic group toward Kolingba and the Yakoma lasted decades. Paranoia of 
future coup attempts caused Kolingba to stack both the regular army officer corps and the 
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presidential guard with Yakoma soldiers. In a few years, Yakoma, who make up roughly 
5 percent of the population, accounted for 70 percent of the army.42 He also put family 
members and coethnics in management positions in many parastatals. As one western 
diplomat serving in Bangui put it: “He invented ethnicity, if one understand by that the 
manipulation of tribalism for political ends in a country united by a lingua franca, Sango, 
and in which the origin of the people had not had any importance for some time.”43 For 
over a decade, those coethnics of Kolingba reaped the benefits of state resources while 
the rest of the country was left in the cold. 
This favoritism would be the General’s ultimate undoing. As the Cold War came 
to an end, France revisited its Africa policy and decided to pare down military forces 
stationed on the continent and move away from dictators. Kolingba announced future 
multi-party elections on the radio, bluntly stating that he came to decision “because those 
who pay us asked me to.”44 Considering the political significance of ethnicity and the 
percentage of Central Africans of Yakoma, this was a political death sentence for 
Kolingba. In 1993, elections carefully organized by France brought Ange-Felix Patassé to 
power.  
Patassé initially took the opposite approach of his predecessor. He came to power 
thanks to a political alliance between the Gbaya and Sara-Kaba under the banner of his 
party, Mouvement pour la Liberation du Peuple Centrafricain (MLPC). Both hail from 
the northwest, a part of the country that had felt marginalized by the French during the 
colonial era.45 Together, the Gbaya and Sara-Kaba make up roughly 45 percent of the 
population. Not only can the next two largest ethnic groups not muster similar numbers, 
but their home regions do not border each other.46 The “Northern Alliance,” as it was 
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known, was easy to mobilize because of their shared experiences and provided Patassé 
with the numbers to grab the presidency.  
However, within a few years, Patassé increasingly favored his own ethnic group. 
He shifted the presidential guard, entirely Yakoma at the time, into the regular army and 
he replaced it with a regional militia made up entirely of Sara-Kaba men, his own ethnic 
group. The transferred officers viewed the move as a demotion and were further rankled 
by budgetary cuts to the regular army as French assistance dried up.47 This led to a 
number of mutinies over arrears. One in 1996, drew a response from France after French 
businesses were attacked. Hundreds of French troops descended on Bangui and dozens of 
civilians were killed in the crossfire.48  
In addition to security problems, the regime also had issues on the economic 
front. Patassé installed family members in key government positions and prioritized his 
own ethnic group.49 Patassé, who preferred attending ceremonies and travelling to 
governing, followed the hands-off approach of his predecessor. Refusing to control his 
cabinet, rent-seeking behavior exploded during his tenure.50 This was compounded by a 
drying up of international aid dollars. Not only was France looking to spend less in 
Africa, but international development organizations were hesitant to invest in the Central 
African Republic by Patassé’s anti-western rhetoric.51 As violent clashes continued and 
the economy slide backwards, the only who seemed to prosper were those inner circle of 
the regime.  
Patassé also had a hard time making allies abroad. Because he had assisted 
Congolese opposition-turned rebel leader Jean-Pierre Bamba to smuggle diamonds via 
Bangui’s airport, the regime in Kinshasa cut off Patassé’s regime from oil refined in the 
western DRC. Libya’s Omar Qaddafi stepped into offer not only oil but also military 
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assistance to offset the losses from France’s drawback.52 Not only was this a shock to 
Paris, which did not want to see Qaddafi’s influence rise in francophone Africa, but it 
also angered the Central African Republic’s northern neighbor, Chad. Idriss Déby had 
been in power in Chad since 1990, but Chad’s rivalry with Libya dates back to the late 
1960s. Déby viewed Libyan involvement in the Central African Republic as an attempt to 
open a second front in their rivalry.53  
Despite serious issues home and abroad, Patassé still managed to win reelection in 
September 1999. His win was made possible by a few factors. The first, his opponents, 
David Dacko and Andre Kolingba, were not widely popular. Secondly, he directed his 
campaign at his Sara ethnic group and their Gbaya neighbors, who together made up 
nearly 45 percent of the population.54 And finally, in the years leading up to election, his 
regime had begun to support a number of regional militias.55 This support was 
particularly important because after years of neglect security services outside of the 
presidential guard had become incredibly ineffective. To protect from bandits, smugglers, 
or even armed groups from any of the Central African Republic’s neighbors—four of the 
country’s five neighbors experienced internal conflict in the 1990s—Central Africans 
living outside of Bangui and its suburbs formed regional militias to replace the army and 
police. Promising butter to some ethnic groups and a supply of guns to others, Patassé 
managed to eked out a victory in an election that was noted for more than a few 
irregularities.  
Five months after the election, violence rocked the Central African Republic. On 
May 28, a group of fighters attacked the presidential palace with rocket propelled 
grenades but was repulsed by the presidential guard after a few hours of fighting. Perhaps 
thinking the attack had been successful, General Kolingba announced on the radio he was 
behind the coup.56 In response, Patassé took a number of steps against those perceived as 
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enemies. Almost immediately, he dispatched troops, including Libyan soldiers and 
Congolese rebels, to run any Yakoma Central Africans out of Bangui. Nearly 300 were 
killed and tens of thousands fled.57 Patassé then disbanded a number of predominantly 
Yakoma army units serving outside of Bangui and shrank the size of the presidential 
guard in favor a Libyan troops on the grounds their loyalty was not in question. Finally, 
in November, he attempted to arrest his army chief of staff and former compatriot, 
François Bozizé who was suspected of being involved in the coup.58 Bozizé narrowly 
escaped his arrest and made his to Paris via Chad. It marked an end to the “northern 
alliance” between the Gbaya and Sara-Kaba.59 Identity was an effective tool for elites to 
grab and maintain power.  
3. The Rise of Chadian Influence and the Incidental Muslim Takeover 
With Patassé increasingly isolating himself and the economy screeching to a halt 
because of the violence, his time in power was not for long. Miraculously evading his 
French police escort, Bozizé flew to Chad in November 2002 and began planning an 
invasion with Déby. Déby’s interest in the Central African Republic stems from a desire 
to secure his own position. The product of a rebel group that had ties the Chadian-Central 
African-Sudanese border area himself, Déby recognized the importance of having 
leverage in the Central African Republic. He also had to be concerned with the Chadian 
diaspora living in Bangui which harbored many anti-Déby sentiments.60 Without said 
leverage, the Déby regime exposes itself to potential coups or insurgencies that foment on 
Chad’s southern border. This vulnerability encouraged Déby to at minimum seek friendly 
relations with Bangui and have a role in every power transition in the country since he 
seized the Chadian presidency 1990.61  
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Appealing to Central African Republic’s neighbors on Bozizé’s behalf, Déby not 
only arranged their approval but also money, weapons, and fighters.62 In March 2003, 
while Patassé was abroad for an economic summit, Bozizé struck. With a handful of 
Central African officers and a force comprising mainly of Chadians, Bozizé came down 
from the northeast of the country and took Bangui without organized resistance from the 
army, presidential guard, or French forces.63 Everyone decided they had enough of 
Patassé.  
Bozizé’s first weeks in power were rocky ones. His “liberators,” as they referred 
to themselves, went on a widespread looting spree. An estimated 600 vehicles were 
driven to Chad over the course of two weeks.64 Even the Central Africans in the group 
were not of from Bozizé’s Gbaya ethnic group, had little loyalty to him and participated 
in the chaos.65 He appealed to Déby, who obliged and sent Chadian regulars to help bring 
order.66 Most liberators fled with their loot back to their homes rather than fight the 
Chadian soldiers. Though a brief, this period of lawlessness would leave a distaste in 
many Central Africans for both Chadians and rebel groups from the northeast.  
After restoring order in the capital, Bozizé went about forming his government 
and planning for the future. The initial signs looked good: his interim cabinet was both 
multi-ethnic and technocratic and he promised elections within two years. There was also 
a general sense among Central Africans that Bozizé, a lifelong soldier who abstained 
from alcohol, could be trusted.67 However, after winning an election that was deemed 
free and fair by the United Nations in the spring 2005, Bozizé’s vision took a turn. 
Convinced that the people gave him a blank check, Bozize began replacing technocrats 
with his kin and kith.68 Much like how Sara-Kaba elites flourished under Patassé and 
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Yakoma elites under Kolingba, the Gbaya began to benefit from a coethnic running the 
state.  
Not even a month after the election, the Army for the Restoration of the Republic 
and Democracy (APRD) began conducting raids on army positions. Ange-Felix Patassé 
controlled the APRD from his exile in Togo and the group was comprised of officers 
from Patassé’s presidential guard and local militias and bandits that operate in the 
northwestern Central African Republic where Patassé is from.69 Bozizé sent his forces, 
including some Chadian soldiers who were more or less permanently stationed in Bangui, 
to put down the rebels. They did so quite brutally. Indiscriminate killings and rape 
became common occurrences. An estimated 100,000 people fled their homes. As one 
Catholic priest put it “[the government forces] have no respect for life. As far as they are 
concerned, the lives of people who do not belong to their ethnic group are worth 
nothing.”70 Fighting lasted until 2007 and the signing of the Sirte Accords with Qaddafi 
acting as the guarantor of the agreement. Many of the APRD’s top leaders—notably 
except Patassé—received government positions. The accord also stipulated that the army 
would secure the regions from bandits (the irony of this considering the APRD’s 
composition must have been ignored).71  
In the spring of 2006, a year after the APRD took up arms, the Union of 
Democratic Forces for Unity (UFDR in its French acronym) launched its own 
insurrection in the northeastern province, Vakaga. The UFDR was comprised mainly of 
militiamen from the local Gula and Runga ethnic groups and formed in response to 
tensions and violence with nomadic herdsmen from neighboring Chad and Sudan.72 The 
group’s leaders were: Captain Akabar Sabone, a dismissed and disgruntled liberator, 
Major Hassan Justin, a former officer in Patasse’s presidential guard, and Michel 
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Djotodia, a Soviet-educated former civil servant.73 UFDR’s official grievances include 
the underdeveloped nature of Vakaga (even for Central African standards), insecurity 
caused by Chadian and Sudanese armed groups, and the political marginalization of the 
region—though at least two of three leaders had other reasons to rebel against Bozizé.74  
Sabone and Djotodia were arrested while in Benin at Bozizé’s behest but the 
rebellion persisted. In October 2006 the UFDR took the largest town in the province, 
Biaro. The town was retaken by the army with the help of 18 French military advisers. In 
the end, a counterattack by the UFDR hastened their own defeat. French President 
Jacques Chirac could not risk French soldiers being killed or taken hostage as he was in 
the middle of a reelection campaign. He ordered a paratrooper regiment to airdrop into 
Biaro and defend it against UFDR attack.75 With two leaders in prison and the 
unexpected arrival of the French military, the UFDR signed a peace agreement with the 
regime in Libreville, Gabon. The agreement called for the UFDR’s envelopment into the 
regime and a payment of 50,000 Central African Francs.76 Thus, Bozizé’s position was 
bolster again by an election, this time in France. 
These rebellions would have drastic effects on the Bozizé regime. In the 
aftermath, Bozizé felt increasingly dependent on France and Chad. He had relied on 
soldiers from both countries to bring about peace. In an effort to counterbalance this 
dependence Bozizé signed a bilateral defense agreement with South Africa. South 
African troops deployed to the Central African Republic ostensibly to train the Central 
African Army but also to protect mines that coincidentally had been taken over by South 
African firms.77 This move chilled relations with Central African Republic’s neighbors, 
especially Chad, as well as France. Déby viewed Bozizé as his liege-man in Bangui and 
felt betrayed by the move.  
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Domestically, the rebellions had two political effects. First, they further 
entrenched a longstanding dynamic in the Central African Republic: the most effective 
way to achieve anything is to get it with a Kalashnikov. In fact, victory was no longer 
necessary. Both losers received payments for peace. A number of groups popped up, 
some actually attacking villages, some merely threatened to, all hoped to receive 
disarmament funds. This led to a mostly French EU Force deployed to the country to 
keep order.78 Secondly, Bozizé relied on his Gbaya ethnic group even more than before. 
Anyone of suspected loyalty was replaced with either a direct family member or a Gbaya 
person. His son became the Minister of Defense, a nephew the Minister of Mines, the 
Minster of Energy, and the Treasurer, another cousin the Minister of Tourism, and yet 
another the party whip in Parliament.79  
The Central African Republic trudged through another five years of sporadic 
“rebellions,” payoffs, and nepotism. Foreign soldiers (a combination of both French 
soldiers, other from neighboring states, and South Africans) kept the situation from 
spiraling out of control. Things came to a head in January and March 2011 when 
Bozizé’s party, Na Kwa Na,—Sango for “work, nothing but work”—claimed huge 
victories in both the legislative and presidential elections. Opposition figures, who had all 
laid down their arms in the months leading up to the elections, characterized both as 
fraudulent.80 With no apparent way to oust the increasingly isolated regime through legal 
processes, the potential for armed conflict returned.  
Initially it seemed like the isolated and divided rebel groups might not change the 
status quo as they could easily be dealt with individually bought off or eliminated. That 
changed in August 2012 when a number of groups operating in and around Vakaga 
province formed the Séléka (meaning “coalition” or “alliance” in Sango). The UFDR, 
with its leadership released from prison after the Libreville agreement was signed, joined 
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four other groups that operated in the area.81 Many of the men were former liberators 
released by Bozizé and, given the dynamics of the northeast, Muslim. The Séléka’s 
demands centered around the government’s lack of inclusivity and failure to provide 
financial support to former rebels as required by the various peace agreements negotiated 
during Bozizé’s tenure.82 In December 2012, they proved their seriousness by launching 
an offensive that came within 110 miles of Bangui, routing both the army and 
international forces in their way.83  
At this point, Bozizé implemented his tried and true strategy: pay off the 
opposition. The two sides again met in Libreville and signed a peace deal on 11 January 
2013. The Séléka agreed to withdraw to Vagaka and to allow Bozize to remain in power. 
In exchange, the regime gave a number of Séléka leaders positions in the transitional 
government and agreed to expel any foreign troops not under the United Nations.84 A 
tense peace swept the country.  
After a few weeks it became obvious neither side planned to uphold the 
agreement long-term. While Bozizé distributed arms among the population of Bangui in 
the name of “popular defense,” the Séléka’s ranks swelled with inclusion of bandits, 
poachers, and more fighters from Chad (the latter with Déby’s alleged encouragement).85 
The final confrontation happened on 22 March 2013 when the Séléka came thundering 
down from the northeast, their ranks swelling with even more bandits, poachers, and 
militiamen as they went. Within 48 hours, Bozize had fled across the Ubangi to Congo 
and Bangui was in control of the Séléka. Michel Djotodia was installed as the transitional 
president.86  
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Unlike the aftermath following Bozizé’s coup, these rebel forces went far beyond 
looting Bangui. Indiscriminate killings and rape were common occurrences. Séléka forces 
razed villages to the ground. As it became apparent Djotodia could not or would not 
control the Séléka even more groups took up the Séléka banner to justify their activity. 
Everyone from bandits, to foreigners crossing the border for loot, to legitimate self-
defense militias referred to themselves as Séléka fighters. Between March 2013 when 
Bangui was taken and May 2013 it is estimated that the Séléka grew four times in 
numbers.87 This meant that the violence was not contained to Bangui and its immediate 
capital but spread in most areas of the country.88 Thousands were killed and tens of 
thousands fled their homes. 
4. Southern Response to the Séléka Takeover 
The uniqueness of the Séléka’s seizure of power should not be overlooked as it 
forced southern elites to reinvent themselves yet again. Never before had a true Muslim 
been in power and never somebody from the northeast. It broke the unending cycle of 
violence between southern elites. To harken back to the literature review, one of Brass’ 
situations of elite conflict that encourage identity formation is a local aristocracy 
maintaining privilege against a foreign invader. The isolation of the northeast from the 
rest of the CAR meant that they had no allies among those groups who were familiar with 
the CAR’s political struggles and were largely seen by southerners as foreign invaders. 
For southern elites, Christianity represented an identity that could cross ethnic lines and 
still isolate the Séléka’s leadership from finding broad support in the south. 
In response to the lawlessness throughout the country regional militia networks 
mobilized to fight the Séléka threat. These groups began collectively referring to 
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themselves as anti-Balaka. Christians dominated their ranks as these groups drew on 
locals for their fighters. The anti-Balaka treated civilian with equal respect as the Séléka, 
they executed prisoners and suspected Séléka sympathizers regularly. Busses would 
frequently be stopped and riders executed on the side of the road based on their religious 
affiliation.89 Killings and reprisals by each side only served to harden the resolve of the 
other and encouraged most following the crisis to describe it with an ancient hatreds lens. 
In an effort to stop the violence, Djotodia announced he was disbanding the 
Séléka and ordered them to return home in September 2013. However, in reality, he had 
little control over the fighters (especially the newcomers) and few obeyed his orders.90 
By this time nearly 1.5 million Central Africans—a third of the population— had fled 
their homes and the United Nations issued warnings about a potential genocide.91 By 
December, France, with the blessing of the U.N., launched Operation Sanagaris to restore 
public order and protect civilians. After a few weeks, thousands of additional U.N. 
peacekeeping troops, mostly from a number of African countries, India and Pakistan 
followed. The next month, a summit of African leaders in Chad pressured Djotodia and 
his government to resign and installed a transitional government (Transitional National 
Council, TNC) headed by a former mayor of Bangui, Catherine Samba-Panza.92 Even 
with Djotodia ousted and an influx of peacekeepers the troubles afflicting the Central 
African Republic were far from over.  
Despite the efforts of the international peacekeepers the situation continued to 
smolder. Both the Séléka and the anti-Balaka splintered, though groups continue to fight 
under those banners.93 According to Human Rights Watch, over 250 civilians were killed 
through the first ten months of 2017, countless more have been maimed or are the victims 
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of sexual violence.94 Although Christian Central Africans were certainly among the 
victims, Muslims, perhaps because of their relative few numbers, have been particularly 
vulnerable in the years following the Séléka’s takeover and subsequent ouster. Their 
minority status in the south makes mobilizing an adequate defense from Christian militias 
difficult. Eighty percent of the Central African Republic’s Muslim community has fled 
the country and 417 of the country’s 435 mosques have been destroyed.95 Unlike other 
periods of the country’s history, the fallout of Séléka crisis does not appear to have an 
end in sight.  
B. RELIGIOUS CONTEXT 
This section will outline the religious demographics of the Central African 
Republic. These demographics show the minority position Muslim Central Africans are 
in and explain why, for many years, elites did not view religion as a suitable identity to 
mobilize in an effort to take power. 
Roughly half of the country’s 5.2 million people are Christian, split evenly 
between Catholics and Protestants (Pentecostalism is the fastest growing protestant sect). 
Muslims make up another 15 percent of the population, with the overwhelming majority 
belonging to Sunni Sufi sects. The final third of Central Africans practice indigenous 
forms of animism.96 These demographic numbers mean that in a religious conflict 
(violent or political), the Muslim community is at an extreme disadvantage.  
Though they live in nearly every region of the Central African Republic, Muslims 
are the majority in only a few places in the country. The most prominent area is the 
northeast region of the country, in all of Vakaga province and parts of the Bamingui-
Bangoran and Haute-Kotto provinces. They are members of the Gula and Runga ethnic 
groups and have lived in what is now the Central African Republic since before the 
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arrival of the French.97 Outside of this region, the only area where Muslims live in 
significant numbers are certain neighborhoods and suburbs in and around Bangui. These 
Muslims tend to be immigrants—or their descendants—from Chad, Sudan, West Africa, 
and the Middle East.98 The lack of a concentrated Muslim population in the south meant 
that in there was little incentive by southern politicians to mobilize Islamic identity as 
they would be dominated by their Christian neighbors.  
Conversely, Christianity is an effective tool for elites to mobilize if a Muslim 
group were to take power in the Central African Republic. Outside of the capital city 
Bangui, the nearest area of country with a majority Muslim population is hundreds of 
miles away. It would be difficult for a Muslim group to find widespread support outside 
of Bangui if religion were mobilized.  
C. CONCLUSION 
This chapter has shown that for the majority of the last four decades, Central 
African elites chose to mobilize ethnic or regional identities over religious ones. This is 
because the demographics of the Central African Republic suggest that religion would 
not be politically mobilized. A mobilization of Christianity would not differentiate 
southern ethnic groups enough. While a mobilization of Islamic identity would result in 
domination by Christians. The only scenario where it would be logical to mobilize 
religion over ethnicity is if a incidentally Muslim group took power. This did not happen 
until Chadian President Déby rid himself of Bozizé and threw Chadian support behind 
the Séléka. Only then did the conditions permit the mobilization of religious identity.  
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III. ENABLING THE ELITES: MASS-LEVEL DYNAMICS 
When the Séléka took power in March 2013, southern political elites of every 
ethnic group found themselves removed from power. They then mobilized behind 
religion as it was the one identity that cut across ethnic cleavages. The shift did not take 
long to reach the mass level. Within weeks of the Séléka takeover Christian militias 
began indiscriminately attacking Muslim neighborhoods and hamlets. The speed at which 
average Central Africans responded to elite overtures is a result of mass-level differences 
and tensions between Christian and Muslims that existed in country before the Séléka 
crisis.  
This chapter studies the differences that created these tensions. There are three 
categories of factors that created these differences. The first category is largely the result 
of the geography of the northeast region of the country. Rough terrain largely isolated the 
region from the remainder of the country and led it to develop different social and 
economic norms. The second category is socio-economic differences between Christians 
and Muslims that developed in the southern Central African Republic. The former 
allowed Christian elites the Séléka to be framed as a foreign force. While the later 
allowed Muslims living in all parts of the Central African Republic to be lumped in with 
the Séléka as foreigners or sympathizers. Third category is more modern. It is the 
increased use of telecommunications by average Central Africans. This allowed atrocities 
committed by both sides to by widely known. This helped compound communal fears 
and harden sectarian identities.  
A. REMOTENESS OF THE NORTHEAST AND CENTRAL AFRICAN 
IDENTITY 
Former Central African prime minister Jean-Paul Ngoupandé once referred to the 
northeast portion of the country, the birthplace of the Séléka, as “another world.”99 The 
region developed somewhat independently of the rest of the country because of a number 
of cultural, political, and geographical reasons. This led to a feeling of isolation on the 
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part of those from the region and in some ways created an identity that is different from 
what typically found in the south. These differences allowed southerners to doubt the 
Séléka’s Central Africanness despite attempts by the Séléka to signal to the contrary.  
Geography and climate partly explain the northeast region of the Central African 
Republic developed independently from the rest of the country. There are roughly 500 
airliner miles between Bangui and the Vakaga province’s capital city, Biaro. However, 
during the rainy season, the distance might as well be 500 million miles. The rains turn 
the area in between into impassable marshlands. Since there are few all-weather roads in 
the country, the northeast is largely unreachable from the south with ground 
transportation.100 Air transit into the area is also difficult as there are only a few dirt 
airstrips in the region. Chad and the Sudans have the same arid savanna climate as the 
northeast region of the Central African Republic, meaning it is easier to conduct 
international trade than domestic trade for Central Africans living in the northeast. 
These conditions have ensured the people who live in northeastern Central 
African Republic have deeper ties to those living in modern day Chad and Sudan than 
they do to their southern Central African compatriots. For example, although Sango, the 
national language of the Central African Republic, is spoken in the northeast, most 
Central Africans in the area grow up speaking Arabic. Also, the Sufi brotherhoods that 
dominate the regions owe allegiance to orders located in Chad or the Sudans.101 On top of 
the previously-mentioned economic differences, there are real cultural differences 
between the northeast region and the rest of the Central African Republic. 
These differences contributed to the Central African Republic lacking what Pierre 
Englebert would call horizontal legitimacy—that is a lack of an agreement who qualifies 
as “Central African.”102 Though Central Africans living in the northeast consider 
themselves Central Africans, this view is not shared by their compatriots to the south for 
a number of the reasons. First, similar to some in the United States who argue that 
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Christianity is intrinsically part of American identity, many Central Africans argue that to 
be truly Central African one must be Christian.103 This was likely influenced by 
favoritism by both colonial and contemporary governments on predominantly Christian 
ethnic groups. Secondly, the pride many Central Africans have in Sango, being the only 
African country with a wholly African national language, makes speaking Sango a 
requirement for “Central Africaness,” a requirement many northeasterners do not 
meet.104 Finally, many southerners point to the economic and cultural links to other 
countries that many in the region maintain as a disqualifying factor.105 These differing 
views on who is a valid Central African meant that during the Séléka crisis, many on the 
Anti-Balaka side saw any Muslim as sympathizing with foreign invaders. Although it 
does not excuse the abuses, it does contextualize them.  
Many actions by the government leading up to the Séléka crisis suggest the 
government shared this opinion. Even though the people of the northeast region have 
familial and cultural connections that cross international borders, these connections are 
not always harmonious. For decades, Runga and Gula herdsmen clashed with herdsmen 
from Sudan over grazing grounds.106 The government did little to protect its citizens. The 
army never deployed to the area in large numbers and, to this day, there are only two 
border control points along the 750 miles of border in the region.107 Though at one point, 
the Bozize regime negotiated reparations from Sudan after a particularly violent episode, 
the regime also promptly embezzled the payments and the money never made it to the 
affected communities.108 
Despite being kept at arms-length by the state, northeasterners often display 
loyalty to the Central African Republic. In April 2006, a group of Chadian rebels set up 
camp in the Vakaga province with the intention of using it as a staging ground to launch 
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attacks into Chad. A local sheikh took it upon himself to tip off Central African 
authorities of the rebels’ arrival. However, when the Central African army arrived, they 
attacked the local Gula population, killing civilians and burning homes for supposedly 
abetting the rebels.109 Decades of neglect and similar abuses led to the ethnic groups of 
the northeast uniting under the Séléka banner. Their diversity meant they had to use their 
least common denominator: Islam.  
The isolation of the northeast portion of the country led to vast cultural 
differences in the region compared to the rest of the Central African Republic. In the 
northeast, an Arabic-speaking, Sunni Arab society developed. While in the south, a 
Sango-speaking Christian and Animist society sprang up. These differences enabled 
southern elites to paint the Séléka to as foreign invaders. However, long before the elites 
started to push this narrative, southern Central Africans long considered Christianity and 
Sango as a key feature of “Central Africanness.” To harken back to the literature review, 
the Séléka crisis could be seen in Fearon and Laitin’s assertion that marginalized 
members of society will contest common assumptions about identities. The contest over 
who counts as Central African, and thus has access to state resources and protection, 
became violent but its roots are in a philosophical debate surrounding what it means to be 
Central African.  
B. OCCUPATIONAL DIFFERENCES ENCOURAGE SECTARIAN 
DISTRUST 
The differences between Muslim and Christian Central Africans is not merely a 
product of geography. In the south, differences in occupation, compounded by religious 
divides, led to a society riddled with distrust. Though the difference in profession may 
seem a minor point in the grand scheme of things, it can determine the way people view a 
variety of issues and values. Farmers may be incentivized to have large families to help 
work the land and may not be able to send their children to school. An urban shopkeeper 
may have an incentive for a smaller family—as the shop is only so big—and might be 
able to afford to send the few she has to school.  
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In the Central African Republic, professional differences are compounded by 
religious differences that create animosity between the two groups. Christians typically 
work for the government or farm the land. Conversely, Muslims dominate the private 
sector, which includes everything from small grocery stores in Bangui to management 
positions in timber firms, or raising cattle. Both the Arab and European slave trades 
contributed to this division in two ways. First, southern ethnic groups, who now tend to 
be Christian, were devastated by slave raiding. Low population density from the slave 
trade continues to impede modern economic growth, because when the slave raiding days 
ended, southern ethnic groups found themselves in a weak position to develop.110 
Secondly, the northern ethnic groups tend to be Muslim and thus were either a part of 
slave raiding or were better able to defend themselves from raiders. These trading 
networks did not end with slavery and do not stop at international borders. To this day, 
many Muslim groups draw cultural, religious, and economic support from groups in Chad 
and both Sudans.111 During colonialism, France did not encourage indigenous industry or 
develop the country, which made these Muslim Central Africans economic networks vital 
to prosperity. This uneven footing more easily allowed Muslim Central Africans to 
become entrepreneurs, compared to Christians.  
Despite a history of intermarriage and cooperative relationships, the Muslim 
domination of business led to some tensions and jealousies between the two groups.112 
These tensions stem from a regional belief common among both Christians and Animists 
regarding private property and the accumulation of person wealth. Rooted in an 
egalitarian outlook on both land and personal property, e.g., the idea that improving the 
situation of the community is more important than improving the situation of the 
individual, thus they consider the accumulation of personal wealth (such as running a 
business) selfish and even a sign of sorcery.113 Islam, on the other hand, encourages 
accumulating individual wealth as long as one tithes appropriately. An individual who 
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accumulated more wealth is required by the Islamic tenant of Zakat to give more to the 
mosque or other Islamic organization, while these organizations in turn better society.114 
These diametrically opposed views on wealth created tension between the two groups, 
especially in urban areas, where many Muslim migrants live and intermingling with other 
religious groups is common.  
Due to the chaos and violence endemic to the Central African Republic, society 
largely carries out its own justice. Those suspected of sorcery are usually condemned to 
death by communal beating.115 This mob violence takes place in both rural and urban 
environments. -level government officials including police and military officers have 
been known to take part in these acts.116 The participation of low and mid-tier state 
officials suggest that elites could not control this behavior even if they wanted to and that 
the masses drive the actions of elites.  
In the last decade, the increase of Pentecostal churches throughout the country has 
brought many of these tensions to the forefront. These awakening churches, as they are 
known, place a strong importance on combating sorcery, even advocating for individual 
parish members to inflict violence on suspected sorcerers. Pentecostal churches in Bangui 
regularly pass out literature and give literal soapbox speeches warning passersby of 
Christians being coerced to convert to Islam and publicizing ISIS’s latest terror attack in 
Europe.117 These actions primed many of the Christian inhabitants of Bangui and its 
suburbs to the intercommunal distrust and animosity that came with the Séléka crisis.  
Relatedly, this division encourages Muslims and Christians to hold starkly 
different outlooks regarding both the economic goals of the state and government 
corruption. Since Muslims dominate commercial enterprises, Christians largely farm or 
work in the civil service (Muslims generally have a hard time finding employment in the 
civil service). Christians in the Central African Republic do not take issue with 
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government officials using their office to profit as long as they enrich their community 
(i.e., ethnic group) at the same time.118 This particularly infuriates Muslims, as they are 
typically the ones who must pay bribes or permit fees to run their businesses. Even when 
Christians acknowledge that rent-seeking is not an ideal practice, often they shrug off the 
bribes or shakedowns off, since Muslims are believed to be wealthy and thus can afford 
to pay.119 One feature of the Séléka crisis is that when the group took the capital city, and 
in the days immediately following, thousands joined their ranks to get their share of the 
loot. One reason frequently cited by these late-comers when explaining their reasons for 
joining the Séléka were these abuses targeted at the Muslim community by Christian 
government officials.120  
In areas outside of Bangui or large villages, another Christian-Muslim 
professional divide is important. This divide is between agriculturalist and pastoralists. 
Ethnic groups in the Central African Republic that predominantly raise cattle are also 
predominantly Muslim, whereas the predominantly Christian groups raise crops. These 
tensions are particularly prominent in the northwestern part of the country, where the 
semi-nomadic Fulani people drive their herds. The Gbaya, overwhelmingly Christian, 
dominate the region and live sedentary lifestyles. Tensions over land use dates back 
decades, and unlike their counterparts in the city, minor gun-battles periodically erupt 
between Christian farmers and Muslims herdsmen.121  
Though far from the birthplace of the Séléka, the Vakaga province on the opposite 
side of the country, these pastoralist-agriculturalist tensions were still powerful in the 
time before and after the Séléka crisis. After the Séléka took power in March 2013, 
thousands of volunteers took up the Séléka mantle. These volunteers were a motley crew. 
Some were from local self-defense militias, others bandits and highwaymen, but a 
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number were the sons of Fulani pastoralists.122 Attempting to increase the legitimacy of 
their cause by associating themselves with the new regime in Bangui, many Fulani in the 
northwestern corner of the Central African Republic referred to themselves as Séléka 
fighters after Bangui fell to the Séléka in March 2013. The Gbaya and other locals, 
predominantly Christian, in turn began referring to their groups as anti-Balaka.123 Though 
the rivalry over resources predated any contemporary events, the people fighting in it 
never specifically couched their argument in religious terms until after the Séléka crisis.  
C. INCREASED USE OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS INCREASED FEARS 
Social media and cellphones also played a significant role in shifting and 
hardening identities in the Central African Republic. The Séléka committed a number of 
atrocities on their march towards Bangui. Unfortunately for Central Africans, this was not 
out of the ordinary for Central African coups. The rebel groups that supported both 
Patassé and Bozizé during their rises to power both committed countless crimes against 
the general public.124 A key factor between those instances of conflict and the Séléka 
crisis was a significant increase in telecommunication networks. From the turn of the 
century to the beginning of the Séléka crisis, there was an increase in home Internet use 
nearly 60-fold. This change is on top of a similar increase in cell phone usage.125 This 
increase in telecommunications usage allowed atrocities to be widely shared, stoking 
fears and hardening identities. 
Before the Séléka reached Bangui, the city was already on edge. In part, this was 
because Central Africans in Séléka-controlled territory posted videos and images of 
atrocities committed against them on Facebook and sent warnings to their family and 
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friends on WhatsApp.126 This set the Christian community on edge, played into 
preexisting tensions, and made them vulnerable to further manipulation by elites. 
It was not just Christian Central Africans who reported the violence on their 
social media pages. When reprisals against Muslim civilians began following the 
Séléka’s capture of Bangui, the Muslim community began a similar trend. In a 
particularly gruesome video posted to Facebook, a group of Christians pulled a man 
suspected Séléka sympathizer off a bus and beat him to death. One member of the mob 
then proceeded to eat the suspected sympathizer’s flesh.127 Social media and cellphones 
amplified the fears of the Muslims Central African community as it did their Christian 
neighbors. 
 Central Africans were able to telegraph warning in ways that were not previous 
available in past coups and instances of violence. This primed Central African for 
intercommunal violence in a new way. This instilled fear into each community. In turn it 
made them turn to elites who promised to protect them from the violence being inflicted 
upon them.  
D. CONCLUSION 
Factors such as geography, migration trends, colonial legacies and government 
policies throughout the Central African Republic’s history encouraged contemporary 
interreligious tensions. However, what caused them to change from what was, at worst, 
benign unpleasantries to violence was fear and uncertainty. As the Séléka march toward 
Bangui, the Christian community became increasingly concerned about potential reprisals 
committed against them by the Séléka for decades of inequality since independence. This 
was justified by the reports of atrocities already being committed by the Séléka spreading 
on social media. These fears caused the Christian community to preemptively lash out 
against the Muslim community. Together, these factors made Central African society ripe 
for elite manipulation. The methods elites used to manipulate society is the topic of the 
next chapter.  
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IV. DOMESTIC ELITE CAPITALIZATION AND CAUSES OF 
IDENTITY SHIFT 
Now that the contextual foundation has been laid and the enabling factors 
discussed, this thesis will now explain elite-mobilization strategies. This chapter begins 
by discussing the characteristics of the southern political elites. These characteristics 
affect the mobilizations strategies available to elites in similar ways to population 
demographics. Next, it analyzes the structures and incentives placed on elites to better 
explain why they mobilize along identity and not ideational lines. It then turns to how the 
elites mobilized religion during the Séléka crisis and the advantages that accompanied 
that mobilization. Finally, this chapter discusses mobilization strategies attempted by 
elites since the Séléka was forced from power.  
A. SOUTHERN ELITE CHARACTERISTICS  
First, it is important to discuss who exactly the elites are in the Central African 
Republic. To harken back to the literature review, Jennifer Todd noted power relations as 
one of the three factors to analyze when studying identity shifts. This section will help 
provide a better foundation for understanding power relations in the Central African 
Republic. Many of the characteristics of a member of the elite in Central African 
Republic encourage that person to seek advantage through extrajudicial means. To do this 
requires embedding oneself in a patronage network (or creating one), which are typically 
organized along ethnic and familial lines.  
The colonial era determined many of the characteristics of the typical Central 
African elite. The first characteristic is that until recently few elites had college 
degrees.128 This is because the French ceded most power to the private sector and made 
very little efforts to invest in the educational system. For example, it was only in 1956 
that the first class of Central Africans graduated secondary school, and that class was just 
1956, the first lycee in the Central African Republic graduated its first class of a few 
dozen students, the pool of Central Africans even qualified to pursue secondary degrees 
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at independence was paltry.129 This meant at independence there were few indigenous 
qualified technocrats. While there was a major push under the Bokassa regime to expand 
educational opportunities to Central Africans, decades of episodic violence and arrears 
led to a crumbling education system. Those elites that do have advanced educations 
typically received their training overseas, usually in France. This left the country with 
few competent technocrats to efficiently run state bureaucracies, even those with earnest 
intentions had few qualifications.  
A second characteristic of the Central African elites is that they rarely have 
backgrounds or experience in the private sector.130 Foreign firms dominated the private 
sector and hired few Central Africans except for manual laborers—rarely managers. 
Thus, the civil service or the army represented the best place for stable, well-paying jobs. 
Government positions became highly valuable. However, as the civil service began to 
deteriorate under the Kolingba regime and government budgets began to dry up, the best 
civil servants, usually those educated overseas, left the country and rent-seeking behavior 
became rampant.131 The latter depressed the economy and further encouraged potential 
elites to avoid the private sector and seek government positions.  
A third characteristic is that Central African elites tend to know one another and 
stems from the previous two. Since there are few schools in the country and the state does 
not have much presence outside the capital, elites intimately know their rivals.132 This 
may explain why, despite the episodic coups that ravaged the Central African Republic, 
few elites have been killed by their rivals. Elites fall in and out of power, spend time in 
prison or go into exile abroad, but rarely does the security service assassinate a given 
president’s rivals.133 Forging a temporary alliance across competing ethnic and regional 
cleavages is a difficult task to accomplish. However, the political elites knowing each 
other from school and their days in the civil service would make it easier. This chapter 
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will show later how elites made these temporary alliances at all stages of the Séléka 
crisis.  
These characteristics have a large impact on power relations in the Central 
African Republic. First, a lack of education among bureaucrats meant that hiring actions 
or promotion based on merits was largely impossible, encouraging corruption and 
nepotism. Second, with little private sector experience or opportunities government 
positions are seen as a path to personal stability, vastly increasing the value of these jobs. 
And finally, the relatively small and interconnected circle of elites allowed them to 
reinvent themselves when necessary. This is key to shift from one identity to another 
when mobilizing in different eras. 
B. STRUCTURES AND INCENTIVES 
Before exploring how elites used religious identity to gain political power, it is 
important discuss what incentives influenced their decision making. Central African 
political institutions are incredibly weak and checks on the executive branch are nearly 
nonexistent. Since independence, the importance of other branches of the federal 
government and provincial governments severely shrunk. This encourages three 
important dynamics. First, it encourages the use of patronage networks by the President 
to maintain power. These networks usually begin with multi-ethnic relationships to aid in 
the gaining over power, but are slowly paired down to increase efficiency. Second, 
institutional weakness removes avenues for political contestation and advancement and 
encourages conflict to escalate to beyond local and regional levels straight to the national 
level. Third, weak institutions encourage the contestation to be violent in nature and take 
place outside of them. Together, these factors incentivize elites to mobilize social 
identities rather than to contest for power based on political ideologies.  
Of the many things the Central African Republic inherited from France, perhaps 
politically the most important was the system of government. In the years leading up to 
the Central African Republic’s independence, French Prime Minister—and soon to be 
president—Charles De Gaulle ushered in the Fifth Republic. This new Republic 
centralized the government and increased the power of the new office of the president 
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vis-à-vis the office of the prime minister.134 Central African politicians designed a 
government that emulated the Fifth Republic during the decolonization process. This put 
immense power in the hands of the President and, without institutions that could check 
the executive, ensured that the only real offices worth holding in the Central African 
Republic are the presidency or cabinet ministries, making political power zero-sum.135  
What little checks on presidential power existed began to melt away quickly. The 
first action taken by David Dacko, the Central African Republic’s first President, put 
opposition leaders in prison and banned their parties, making the country a one-party 
state.136 This action was not challenged by the courts (whose judges were appointed by 
Dacko). Even when the Central African Republic returned to a multi-party system, the 
opposition did not check the president’s power. If anything, corruption and nepotism 
increased under Patassé and Bozizé. The fact that political parties played little, if any, 
role in the peace processes from the late 1990s to the present suggests that Central 
African elites view unarmed opposition as ineffective.137 True power in the Central 
African Republic rests with the president and his ministers. 
Since there is no institution to check the president even to this day, the personal 
use of state funds and other corrupt practices are rampant. Perhaps nowhere is this better 
exemplified than through the concessionary fees leveled against private firms to operate 
in the country. The Central African government bestows on the firms the right to extract 
natural resources in exchange for millions of dollars.138 In 2011, for example, a Chinese 
oil firm signed an oil exploration deal with the government worth 25 million USD.139 
Firms typically also agree to splitting any future profits from their operations with the 
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government, ensuring these fees are more than one-time payments. If not directly handled 
by the president, then the overseers of these contracts are those whose loyalty cannot be 
questioned, which usually means a family member. In a country as poor as the Central 
African Republic it is easy to see the temptation to force one’s way into the president’s 
patronage network.  
Not only do concessionary contracts create economic incentives but they also 
create political ones that reinforce the importance of the presidency. These agreements 
typically ensure that the firms face few regulations or impediments to their behavior or 
actions. However, the firms must handle everything involved with the extraction and 
transportation of the desired resources. This includes obvious things like road 
improvement and security but also includes building hospitals for the workers and even 
schools for their families.140 Private firms effectively run portions of the Central African 
Republic.141 This, coupled with the fact civil servants far from Bangui often are rarely 
paid by the state, means that enterprising elites cannot look to regional positions such as 
provincial governor or town mayor as a place to begin a promising career in civil service.  
Instead enterprising elites look for positions in federal government in Bangui for 
any possibility for provincial advancement and stability. This raises the political 
contestation beyond the local level. And because of a lack of constitutional norms, often 
times this involved getting a militia together which requires mobilizing support.142 The 
bigger the fighting force, the more likely the elites in Bangui would take the newcomer 
seriously. The fighters that were available for recruitment determined what identities 
want-to-be-elite could use to mobilize his fighters.  
Another source of economic incentivizes under the direct purview of the president 
were internationally donated dollars for the disarmament, demobilization, and 
reintegration (DDR) of the various rebel groups that take up arms against the state. The 
United Nations began to take the issue seriously during the end of Patassé’s regime 
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because of the frequent mutinies by the army and rebellions.143 Though this money is not 
embezzled like concessionary fees (or not embezzled entirely) it is useful for both the 
regime and the recipients of the funds. The former gain yet another way to sure up 
political support of potential adversaries by bringing the rebellions into the president’s 
patronage network. The latter get suitcases full of cash. For example, Florian Ndjadder, 
one elite who came from a prominent military family, successfully negotiated a payment 
for an armed group that later turned out not to exist. The threat that he might have armed 
men at his disposal was enough.144 DDR payments represent yet another way for elites to 
expand their power and influence in the Central African Republic, but only if they are the 
president or in the Ministry of Defense.  
These set of conditionalities have encouraged groups to force their way into 
patronage networks by taking up arms against the state. The benefits of “integration,” as 
Central Africans call the process, is at a minimum a lump-sum payoff to demobilize but 
occasionally a positions in a government ministry or the army.145 Often times, the mere 
threat of force is enough to prompt integration and little violence need be inflicted. Many 
in the upper levels of Séléka’s leadership cited gaining access to state resources as the 
main factor motivating the rebellion.146 They only committed to completely ousting 
Bozizé after early victories when it became apparent their side had the greater strength.147 
Since the government revolves around the president, access to state resources requires 
membership in or ownership of the president’s patronage network. Often Central 
Africans have few alternatives to violence (or the threat of violence) to gain access. 
Ethnic militias may be a good starting point for forcing one’s way into national politics, 
but fighting groups that have successfully overthrown the government were diverse 
coalitions that mustered more support than the government could.  
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C. RHETORIC, SIGNALING, AND ACTIONS IN THE SÉLÉKA CRISIS 
The decentralized nature of both the Séléka and the anti-Balaka make it difficult 
to assess what their true goals were.148 However, the rhetoric elites on both sides used 
show in the beginning days of the conflict they are following the same blue print 
followed by those before them. The Séléka framed themselves as Central African in an 
effort to win the support of southern Central Africans. Bozizé however, had to regain 
support multiethnic support as he had spent the previous few years pairing down his 
patronage network. His solution was to mobilize an identity that united the southern 
ethnic groups: Christianity. Despite the Séléka’s efforts to present themselves as a 
Central African force, religious identity began to politicize and harden as Christian elites 
played up religious dimensions of the conflict.  
The name Séléka is an interesting choice considering where the people came from 
in its ranks. As mentioned earlier, the name is Sango for “alliance.” Yet Sango is not 
widely spoken in the Vagaka province; Sudanese Arabic is the most widely spoken 
tongue. In fact, interviews conducted by relief organizations with survivors of Séléka 
abuses often mention a common theme: the abusers either did not speak Sango at all or 
did so with heavy accents (usually associated with Arabic).149 Using a Sango word to 
name the organization seems a purposeful decision to downplay their region’s differences 
with southern Central Africans.  
However, the choice does make sense from the perspective of the elites leading 
the group. At the time of his overthrow, Bozizé was not a popular man. This is evident by 
the ease at which the Séléka took Bangui. Which the exception of the South Africans who 
lost 11 soldiers, the regular army, and militias supposedly loyal to Bozizé only put up a 
token resistance at best.150 In a scenario where few will be sad to see the dictator go, a 
costly mistake would be to drive others to support the regime. Leading an army largely of 
a different culture, religion, and language just might make people do exactly that. A 
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Sango name both lends legitimacy and attempts to signal the group as Central Africans, 
not foreign invaders.  
Though there were some in the Séléka who had radical Islamic beliefs, many of 
the stated goals and actions of the Séléka elite suggest they intended to act in a manner 
similar to previous rebels-turned-government elites and not push any widespread societal 
changes on Central Africans. Before departing Vakaga, they stated the overwhelming 
majority of their goals in secular terms—most of them revolving around the 
underdevelopment of the northeast region of the country.151 Many Séléka leaders spoke 
of not having a seat at the table—another common refrain of armed groups throughout 
the Central African Republic’s history.152 Upon securing Bangui, the main goal of the 
Séléka, like Bozizé’s liberators before them, they seemed focused on looting and 
pillaging. It was yet another unfortunate but not out of the ordinary period for the citizens 
of Bangui. The transitional government installed by the Séléka also looked nothing out of 
the ordinary. When Michel Djotodia became the head of state major Séléka players 
received top defense, mining, and forestry positions, allowing them to in theory protect 
the new regime and extract resources at will. Other non-Séléka elites received posts at 
more minor ministries in hopes of keeping the peace.153 All of these actions were regular 
occurrences for the Central African Republic, demonstrating the Séléka’s goals were not 
unique. The shift from ethnic to religious mobilization did not fully begin until after the 
Séléka was firmly in power.  
The religious mobilization and violence did not begin with the Séléka, but rather 
with Francois Bozizé. The Séléka’s initial raid to the outskirts of Bangui in December 
2012 proved that they were a serious threat to the Bozizé’s regime. The unpopularity of 
the regime due to years of nepotism and corruption meant he had to act fast to build 
support. During the uneasy peace between the Séléka and the government following the 
first Libreville agreement, Bozizé and his supporters began to warn the residents of 
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Bangui of the threat posed by Muslims.154 “We welcomed the Muslims but they have 
betrayed us,” said a Bangui Christian politician, drawing the connection between the 
Séléka and all Muslims.155 They described the Séléka’s true mission as the Islamization 
of the country.156 This was the first case of elites framing the conflict in religious terms.  
Along with increased rhetoric, the Bozizé regime also began to distribute small 
arms to self-defense groups in and around Bangui in February and March 2013 in 
anticipation of the Séléka’s push south.157 Many of the volunteers for these militias were 
youth members of Bozize’s political party but others simply hailed from Christian 
neighborhoods and towns.158 These groups began to harass and detain local Muslims 
after receiving arms and warnings about their supposed sympathies towards the 
Séléka.159 Any complaints lodged by Muslim Central Africans to the police or the army 
fell on deaf ears. A number of Muslims were detained, some of whom were murdered.160 
This sent terror through the Muslim community. Barricades were erected on the edges of 
Muslim neighborhoods of the Bangui. When the Séléka arrived in the capitol a few 
weeks later, thousands of Muslims residents were ready to join the ranks, regardless of 
their leaderships’ desire to paint themselves as a secular force.161  
Similar to their Séléka counterparts, the leaders of the anti-Balaka movement may 
have used their name to send a signal as well. The name is often described as an 
amalgamation of the Sango word for bullet and AK—as in AK-47. However, “Balaka” in 
the Gbaya language means machete.162 Either translation sends a similar signal. Many 
Séléka fighters carry Kalashnikov rifles and some of the most gruesome attacks on 
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civilians were done with machetes. The “anti” portion of the name implies a defensive 
nature to the group. Recalling both the Séléka’s atrocities and suggesting the anti-Balaka 
are defenders, help frame the Séléka as the aggressor and instigator of the violence. 
This aggressive, foreigner frame mirrors much of what was said about Séléka by 
Christian Central Africans during and after the Séléka crisis. For example, it became 
common for the Christian of Bangui to refer to the months seven months that the Séléka 
was in power as the “rizzia.” Before this, the term was used to describe slave raids 
committed by Muslim raiders from the north.163 Despite many Christians stating their 
only concern was dangerous foreign influences, “no more mosques in CAR” was spray 
painted on Islamic community centers and Muslim-owned businesses throughout Muslim 
quarters of the city.164 The elites framing of the conflict as an invasion of foreign 
Muslims began to reflect in the actions of the masses.  
The Séléka crisis saw the mobilization of religious identity in the Central African 
Republic for the first time. However, it did not begin until after the Séléka captured the 
government. The corruption of the Bozizé isolated it from the majority of southerners, 
leaving it vulnerable to the Séléka. In order to gain support, the regime had to isolate the 
Séléka from any southern support. Since the Séléka’s leadership recruited from their 
Muslim-majority home region, religion was a convenient tool to do so. Without Bozizé, it 
is unlikely that religion would have ever politicized.  
D. MOBILIZING SINCE THE SÉLÉKA’S DEPARTURE FROM POWER  
In January of 2014, Catherine Samba-Panza, the Christian Mayor of Bangui, and 
Mahamat Kamoun, a Muslim and former cabinet member under both Bozizé and 
Djotodia, were elected as President and Prime Minister respectively by the parliament 
(and, importantly, with the acceptance of former Séléka leaders).165 The logic laid out in 
this thesis would predict that if a government made up of members of both religious 
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groups were installed than the incentive to mobilize religious identity would be removed. 
Despite some under currents of sectarian tensions and violence that remained to this day, 
the salience of religion has notably decreased since the Séléka crisis. This section 
discusses mobilization techniques since the end of the Djotodia regime.  
The Séléka never achieved much unity but the group began splintering in late 
2013 when President Djotodia disbanded the group. Despite Djotodia’s announcement, 
few ex-Séléka heeded his call and returned home. Fighting between the various factions 
(and against the anti-Balaka) began almost immediately. The groups reflected their pre-
Séléka makeup with the lines falling largely along regional and ethnic lines. Three of the 
largest groups, the Rassemblement Patriotique pour le Renouveau de la Centrafrique 
(RPRC), the Front Populaire pour la Reniasance de la Centrafrique (FPRC), and the 
Mouvement Patriotique Centrafricain (MPC), are all comprised of fighters from the 
northeastern Central African Republic and southeastern Chad and formed an alliance. 
Their members are from the Runga, Gula, and Salamat ethnic groups.166 The other 
predominantly Muslim militias that these groups clash with are comprised of Muslims 
from Bangui and members of the Fulani ethnic group, a semi-nomadic ethnic group that 
resides in the western portion of the country. This new fighting highlights the fact that the 
events of the Séléka crisis were more about elites finding new paths to power than any 
change in religious attitudes.  
The Christian anti-Balaka networks mobilized during the crisis also went through 
a similar fracturing. Like their ex-Séléka counterparts, Christian groups largely fractured 
along ethnic and regional lines. Many of the groups have ties to politicians who served in 
cabinets prior to the Séléka takeover. At least two groups have direct ties to former 
presidents Ange-Felix Patassé and Francois Bozizé.167 Inter-Christian alliances can be 
predicted by which cabinets the leader formerly served in. Those that had positions in 
Patassé’s regime are more likely to band amongst themselves and former Bozizé regime 
figures are more likely to do the same. This jockeying for position within the Christian 
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community suggests that the Christian identity was used as a unifying tool when 
Christian elites were all thrown from power but did not take deep roots.  
Not only are there new alliances within religious communities in the Central 
African Republic but there are so alliances of convenience between religious 
communities. In October 2016, the FPRC, RPRC, and the MPC allied with a pro-Bozizé 
Anti-Balaka group.168 The Coalition, as it is referred to, brought together leaders who 
committed some of the worst atrocities on both sides during the Séléka crisis. It also is 
the largest force outside of the government and because it controls a number of mining 
sites has the largest war chest of any armed group.169 This union between former rivals is 
perhaps the best evidence that elites altered their strategies following the installation of a 
unity government. 
This is not to say that sectarian violence in the Central African Republic. Samab-
Panza and Kamoun used their inauguration to call on both sides to put their weapons.170 
These appeals too fell on deaf ears as a few days later a Christian mob rioted in a Muslim 
neighborhood of Bangui, killing two Muslims whose bodies were burned in a traffic 
circle.171 Only a few dozen mosques remain in the country compared to hundreds before 
the conflict. Similarly, the number of refugees fleeing the Central African Republic, the 
overwhelming majority of them Muslim, has only increased since the Séléka’s 2014 
departure.172 Elites may have moved on from religious identity but there does appear to 
be an undercurrent of sectarian tensions and violence as a result of the mobilization 
during the Séléka crisis.  
                                                 
168 Dukahn, “Splintered Warfare,” 26. 
169 Dukahn, “Splintered Warfare,” 27. 
170 Mark Cardwell, “New CAR Premier Kamoun: ‘We Must All Work for Peace,’” November 08, 
2014, Deutsche Welle, http://www.dw.com/en/new-car-premier-kamoun-we-must-all-work-for-peace/a-
17846314.  
171 “Central African Republic MPs elect Catherine Samba-Panza” BBC, January 20, 2014, 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-25811250.  
172 Human Rights Watch, “Central African Republic.” 
 53 
E. CONCLUSION 
Years of corruption, underdevelopment, and violence have created powerful 
incentives in the Central African Republic for elites to use extralegal means to gain 
position and power. Elites in the Central African Republic mobilized different identities 
in different times. The logic of which identity to mobilize when was a simple one. When 
they needed to draw on support to gain power they mobilized identities that allowed for 
wider recruitment. When they were in power and wanted to use the country’s political 
system for financial gain, elites fell back on ethnicity to make more efficient patronage 
networks. During the Séléka crisis, the leaders of the Séléka attempted to frame group as 
Central African but were rhetorically cut off by southern elites who effectively mobilized 
religion. As the logic of this thesis would predict, when a regime that represented both 
religions came into office, elites largely abandoned religious mobilization in favor of 
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V. CONCLUSION 
This thesis began with the question: why did Central Africans prioritize religious 
identity over ethnic identity during the Séléka crisis? This thesis researched a number of 
possibilities, from the agendas of domestic and foreign political to mass-level tensions 
and demographic changes. This chapter first summarizes the main arguments in the 
previous chapters. Next, it discusses implications of this work on theoretical and practical 
levels. Then it will make suggestions for future research. Finally, it provides this thesis’ 
relevance for the United States Department of Defense.  
A. FINDINGS 
This thesis argues that the prioritization of religious identity over ethnic identity 
among Central Africans is an example of an elite-driven identity change. After being 
driven from power, southern political elites mobilized Christianity in response to the 
Séléka takeover because it was an identity the majority of southern Central African could 
rally behind. Furthermore, Christianity isolated the Séléka from any southern support as 
the group was overwhelming Muslim. Finally, mobilizing Christianity helped frame the 
Séléka as foreign invaders because it played into a narrative common that in order to be a 
true Central African, one must be Christian.  
The reason this mobilization is unique in the Central Africa Republic’s history is 
that southern political elites had dominated the political landscape since independence. 
The overwhelming majority of southern Central Africans are Christian. Mobilizing 
Christianity against other southerners would not have been effective. Instead, southern 
political elites choose to mobilize ethnicity. In fact, the leaders of the Séléka did not 
initially attempt to mobilize around their religion; instead they tried to present themselves 
as a Central African group. Only when the Séléka took power was it advantageous for 
southern political elites to mobilize their religious identity.  
The speed at which elites successfully mobilized the masses points to the 
existence of underlying tensions at the mass-level. These tensions stem from socio-
economic differences. There are two main causes of these difference. The first are 
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customs that date back before the colonial era. Muslims tend to be involved in trading 
networks that originate in the Arab world, while Christians tend to farm land. The second 
is the geography the Central African Republic that largely isolates the majority of the 
country’s Muslim population in the northeast region. However, these frictions rarely 
erupted beyond the personal or local levels because the identity lacked political salience.  
International factors did not appear to play a significant role in the identity shift. 
Though Chadian President Idriss Déby was the Séléka’s benefactor, he chose to back 
them based on their capabilities and not their faith. Furthermore, his earlier support of 
Bozizé’s coup also suggests Déby had little concerns about the religion of his 
beneficiaries. Déby’s role in bringing a Muslim group to power for the first time in the 
Central African Republic was an incidental side effect of his efforts to maintain leverage 
and influence over the head of state on Chad’s southern border.  
Similarly, research for the thesis found little impact Wahhabi preachers or other 
foreign religious organizations on the shift from religious to ethnic identity. Religious 
organizations with particularly dogmatic beliefs are present in the Central African 
Republic. While they likely incited some individuals to join either the Séléka or the anti-
Balaka, they do not as of now have systemic influence throughout the country. Like the 
influence of Idriss Déby, these factors are intervening variables in the explaining the shift 
of identity in the Central African Republic.  
B. IMPLICATIONS 
This work has a number of implications for the field of ethnic studies. First, the 
Séléka crisis reinforces the importance of understanding the balance-of-power between 
identity groups when discussing identity changes. This factor is important to the analysis 
given by Brass, Fearon and Laitin, and Todd in their works on identity shifts. When the 
Séléka swept to power, the group completely changed power dynamics in the country 
even though they did not initially mobilize specifically around their Muslim identity. A 
principally Muslim group taking power, forced Christian elites to recalibrate their 
mobilization strategies. This case suggests that it might be the most important factor 
when analyzing identity shifts. 
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A second implication of this thesis is the seemingly non-importance of external 
factors. This is interesting in today’s political climate where the concerns about the 
influence of everything from Russian interference in American and European elections to 
the supposed dangers of Sharia law creeping into western society. This thesis suggests 
that those influences are not as important as they seem. Existing power structures and 
intercommunal relations a better predictor of social harmony than external influences.  
C. FUTURE RESEARCH 
This thesis brings forth three topics that warrant future study. This thesis noted 
both that violence has a hardening effect on identities and that the interreligious violence 
continues to this day, especially in the rural parts of the country. The violence continues 
despite the efforts to halt it undertaken by the international community and the current 
Central African government. It is possible that the unprecedented level of violence seen 
during the Séléka crisis harden religious identity to the point it is the primary identity for 
years to come. This research could first further explore the lasting effects of violence on 
identity shifts. It could also study the effectiveness of elites in resetting identity shifts. 
Researching this hypothesis will likely require widespread survey data which will not be 
attainable until hostilities end.  
Relatedly, the role of telecommunications and social media on conflict-based 
identity shifts warrants further study. Perhaps it is not the level of violence seen during 
the Séléka crisis that is keeping Central African elites from putting the pieces back 
together. It may be the level of information available to the masses. Certainly Central 
Africans knew pervious coups and political instability resulted in violence. However, 
there is likely a difference between hearing about intercommunal violence and seeing the 
results of it firsthand.  
Another avenue for study could be to apply the balance-of-power lens to a case of 
nonviolent political turnover. To a certain extent, fears over a real or perceived shift in 
the balance-of-power between different communities is understandable when the balance 
shifts violently. It might be different in a democracy where intercommunal relations 
should be stronger. It would be interesting to apply this lens to the present situation in the 
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United States or Ireland where citizens of a minority ethnic group recently held chief 
executive posts. This thesis would suggest that there would be consolidation and 
mobilization of the ethnic majority group in each country. 
D. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 
There are two important lessons for the Department of Defense to learn from the 
Séléka crisis. First, it is vital to understand the role elites play in intercommunal violence. 
Losing sight of this fact often leads to incorrect understandings of conflict which in turn 
leads to implementing the wrong solutions. Some outside observers framed the Séléka 
crisis as an example of primordial hatreds between two groups that can never live 
peacefully. This is far from the truth. Solutions to mediate a crisis created by political 
elites will be vastly different than those to a crisis revolving around supposed ancient 
hatreds. Following the 2003 invasion of Iraq, sectarian violence led many policymakers 
pushed to divide the country three ways. Iraq’s largest religious groups, it was argued, 
could not possibly live together peacefully. Yet much of the violence was stirred up by 
former Ba’ath Party members. Domestic political elites can often be useful tools cooling 
intercommunal tensions and should not be cast aside. 
Similarly, the Department of Defense should always be skeptical when host 
nation political elites warn of Islamic extremist groups. In the post-9/11 world, an easy 
way to gain access to U.S. military support and funding is to request assistance in 
combating violent extremism. As this thesis has shown, domestic elites can manipulate 
society in a manner that exacerbates sectarian differences for their personal gain. This is 
not to say that all reported instances of violent extremist groups are inaccurate. However, 
it behooves the Department of Defense to independently verify the reports.  
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